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Abstract
Four major milestones mark the almost two centuries of Supreme
Court activity. The first three are the 1803 power-grab in Marbury,l
the invention of “substantive” due process after the Civil War,2 and the
abdication of the Justices as ultimate economic policymakers in the
1930s and ’40s.
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The Supreme Court in a New Role: From Negative
Naysayer to Affirmative Commander*
Arthur S. Miller**

Four major milestones mark the almost two centuries of Supreme
Court activity. The first three are the 1803 power-grab in Marbury,l
the invention of "substantive" due process after the Civil War,2 and the
abdication of the Justices as ultimate economic policymakers in the
1930s and '40s.3 The fourth, and possibly the most significant, is now
clearly evident. Since 1958" the Court at times has been an affirmative
commander as well as a negative naysayer. On occasion, the Justices
tell other government officers what they must do to have their actions
jibe with the fundamental law, rather than what they cannot do. The
Court has become a commander. This article outlines that portentous
development.
At the outset, I recognize the semantic problem: a naysaying decision can be considered to mean that the Justices chose affirmatively to
pursue certain values. For example, by striking down a statute-say,
one providing for minimum wages and maximum hours in employ* Copyright 1981 by Arthur S. Miller. This article is an adaptation of a chapter
to appear in the author's forthcoming book, ORACLE IN THE MARBLE PALACE:
POLITICS AND THE SUPREME COURT, to be published in 1982 by Greenwood Press.
** Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University.

1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
2.

Recounted in A.

MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM

50-62 (1968). See also J.

COMMONS,

LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM

(1924);

McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and

Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34.
3. The turning point came in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), and in National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S.
1 (1937).
4. The new posture of the Court first became explicit in Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1 (1958).
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ment-the Court in the 1890-1937 period could be said to have made a
"must do" pronouncement on corporate rights and to have furthered
business expansion even at the expense of the working class. The semantic problem exists, but my point is different. The Justices in recent
years have begun openly and expressly to command, by issuing opinions
couched in language of affirmative duty laid upon political officers. In
these instances, there is no need to infer a command (as in the employment decisions); it is flatly stated in plain language.
This is a constitutional revolution of the first water. Although it
was not announced as such, the Court moved in an entirely new direction without fanfare. It tried to make the new posture appear a mere
variation on what had gone before; the Court was doing only what
judges had long done. That is far from true; nothing quite like it
has been seen in American history (nor in the history of any other nation). The Justices became a defacto council of elders. By asserting the
right and the power to say what the law is (as in Marbury) they have,
through time and because of widespread acceptance, become able to
say what the law should be. Rather than being "mere umpires," they
now are able to be, in Justice William Brennan's words, "lawmakers-a coordinate branch of government."" The implications of this
development have not yet been seen; there is little reason to think that
the Court will not attempt to carve out an even larger role for itself in
the future.
There is another way of looking at this development. During the
heyday of what I have called the Constitution of Rights or of QuasiLimitations,' the Court chose to emphasize certain rights of personhood
which it attached to economic collectivities. It did so by denying the
government the power to intervene into economic matters. The Justices
spoke in terms of individualism and of laissez-faire. Today there is at
least tacit recognition that the basic unit of society is the group. Conse-

5. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (concurring opinion).
6. In my book, supra note *,I posit that the United States has had four constitutions: the Articles of Confederation, the Document of 1787, as amended (herein called

the Constitution of Rights or of Quasi-Limitations), the Constitution of Powers, and
the Constitution of Control. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981) for further discussion.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/2

2

Miller: The Supreme Court in a New Role: From Negative Naysayer to Affirm
S6:1981

The Court as Affirmative Commander

quently, a concept of status is emerging in constitutional law.' The task
of the Court is to effect the nexus, within the scope of constitutional
values which they identify and articulate for and by themselves, between the individual and the groups (including the nation-state itself)
of a bureaucraticized society. This means that the Court has collectivized constitutional law. One aspect of such collectivism is the propensity, by no means always employed, to issue decrees couched in language of affirmative command. The Justices are attempting to preserve
the values of individualism in a group-dominated nation. In order to do
that, they have had to invent new ways of looking at old problems.
They know that in some manner the stability of "the system" depends
on siphoning off social discontent. Since those in positions of authority,
both public and private, are not likely to police themselves, and are
unlikely to alter the system even minimally, the Court steps in and does
so. In doing that, the Justices act as surrogates for those who benefit
most from the system.
One example will suffice to illustrate the point. In Green v. School
Board," a 1968 decision involving school desegregation, the unanimous
Court used language of duty: "Brown II [the second, implementing decision of Brown v. Board of Education] was a call for dismantling of
well-entrenched dual systems tempered by an awareness that complex
and multifaceted problems would arise which would require time and
flexibility for a successful resolution. School boards such as respondent
[in Green] then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with an affirmative duty. . . to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root
and branch."
No prior court opinion contained language charging administrative
officers with "an affirmative duty" to do something. Thus Green went
far beyond the traditional decisions of the Supreme Court. An express
command aimed at school officials, Green meant that the Justices had
openly entered the political arena, overtly taking part in the travail of
society. The movement was from adjudication (settling only the dis-

7. See Phillips, Status and Freedom in American ConstitutionalLaw, 29
L.J. 3 (1980).

EMORY

8. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
9. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
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putes of the parties at bar) to legislation (stating rules for the public at
large or at least for those similarly situated to the parties in court). It
was a constitutional revolution of the first magnitude. There were forerunners to Green, to be sure, but none used the express words "affirmative duty."10
The Court makes no pretense in such decisions. In philosophic
terms, the Justices have become telocratic; they openly admit as much.
The rules of law they promulgate are instrumental, i.e., goal-seeking,
while most Americans have long believed that the United States is
nomocratic, i.e., rule-governed. That belief, that basic myth, has now
become more than threadbare; it simply is not true. In constitutional
matters the emperor has no clothes."i A government of laws, not of
men, has never characterized the United States. (To the extent it does
so today, it hampers rather than helps the resolution of public-policy
problems.) 2 Telocracy, furthermore, has always been apparent in the
Court's work; the real question is which purposes it was pursuing.
There are, however, two major differences between yesteryear and today. First, the Court is now openly and outwardly purposive; and second, it has broadened the reach of its decisions to cover many more
people.
The Justices choose constitutional questions to decide, not to further the interests of the litigants, but to develop the general law. Chief
Justice Fred Vinson reminded lawyers in 1949 that "you are, in a
sense, prosecuting or defending class actions; . . . you represent not

only your clients, but tremendously important principles, upon which
are based the plans, hopes and aspirations of a great many people
throughout the country." 13 In a true class action, one plaintiff actually
10.

For recent discussion, see J.

BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES

308-09 (1981).

11. Cf. Kurland, Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U.L. REv.
7, 8: "[W]e are repeatedly told by the courts that the current egalitarianism which
they are helping to impose derives from the Constitution. That, I think, is arrant non-

sense. It is not being taken from the Constitution, it is being put into it." See also
Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging?, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
12. "[I]n 1960-80 America became a nation of laws instead of men. The country
had previously thrived by being exactly the opposite, although its lawyers wrote books

pretending it wasn't." 277 THE ECONOMIST (London), No. 7165, Dec. 27, 1980, at 22,
col. 3.
13. Quoted in H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1404 (1953). See also Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD 541, 551
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sues in his own name and on behalf of others similarly situated. In
Brown v. Board of Education14 for example, the immediate litigant,
Miss Linda Brown of Topeka, Kansas, brought suit more for a general
principle than for specific, immediate relief. (Immediate relief, of
course, was also sought, but was not the primary motivation.) Vinson's
remark was an oblique acknowledgment of the Court as legislator, for
often "others similarly situated" do not even know of the lawsuit.
Surely that was true in the Abortion Cases 15 and in the controversial
Miranda6 ruling (concerning the rights of a person caught up in administration of the criminal law). Although the Court has recently
moved to tighten use of class actions, 17 Vinson's point is that all constitutional cases permit judges to rule generally while appearing to do so
only specifically. They are, thus, "backdoor" class actions, 8 and therefore not subject to the statutory and decisional limitations imposed on
true class actions. The Justices, not being logicians, have no difficulty
in stating a general rule from the context of one particular case. The
lesson here should be obvious: the Justices, speaking generally, set their
own rules, both in the procedure to be followed and in the substance
(the rules) to be applied. They have constitutional carte blanche and
can go as far as the political process permits them to go.
II
By fits and starts, with some Sisyphean back-pedaling, the members of the High Bench are overtly pursuing their ideas of justice. They

(1958) (the Court chooses its cases "in the interests of the law, its appropriate exposition and enforcement, not in the mere interest of the litigants.") (quoting C.J. Hughes,
S. REP. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1937)). I have elaborated on the point in

Miller, ConstitutionalDecisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment on the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573 (1982).
14. 347 U.S. 493 (1954).

15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). For
analysis, see Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the
Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187
(1975), reprinted in A.

MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY ch.

8

(1978) [hereinafter cited as Miller & Barron].
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
17. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
18. For brief discussion, see Miller & Barron at 1193.
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do not seem to be bound by pre-existing rules.19 The consequence, as
might be expected, is obvious: ideas of justice, of good public policy,
differ among the nine Justices. I do not suggest this is a new situation,
but some Justices now openly admit that they are law-makers and must
at least try to accommodate the conflicting interests of a pluralistic society. That they are far from successful in the latter goal is revealing
testimony of the shortcomings of pluralism itself as a form of political
order.
The differences between the outward attitude of Justices of yesteryear and those of today are suggested by the following episodes, the
first related by Judge Learned Hand about Justice Holmes and the second personal to myself. Said Hand: "Remember what Justice Holmes
said about 'justice.' I don't know what you think about him but on the
whole he was the master craftsman of our time; and he said, 'I hate
justice,' which he didn't quite mean. What he did mean was this. I
remember once when I was with him; it was on a Saturday when the
Court was to confer. It was before he had a motorcar, and we jogged
along in an old coupe. When we got to the Capitol, I wanted to provoke
a response, so as he walked off I said to him, 'Well, sir, good-bye. Do
justice!' He turned quite sharply and he said, 'Come here, come here.' I
answered, 'Oh, I know, I know.' He replied, 'That is not my job. My
job is to play the game according to the rules'. "120
Holmes had the nineteenth-century view. (It is interesting to compare that episode with his 1873 candid acknowledgment that the rules
were not neutral.)21 He simply did not care about trying to help rectify
some of the injustices of the world. "Savage, harsh, and cruel," as Professor Grant Gilmore described him, 2 he was quite willing as a Justice
on the Supreme Court to aid "the rich and powerful [to] impose their
19.

See Kurland, supra note 11; Forrester, supra note 11. Cf. R.

BERGER,

Gov-

ERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).

20. Quoted in M.
21.

MAYER, THE LAWYERS

490 (1967) (paperback ed. 1968).

See Comment, The Gas-Stokers' Strike, 7 AM. L. REv. 582 (1873), dis-

cussed in Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the Supreme
JudicialCourt, 63 VA. L. REv. 975, 1029-31 (1977). See also Tushnet, Truth, Justice,
and the America Way; An Interpretationof Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies,
57 TEX. L. REv. 1307 (1979).

22. G.

GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/2
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will on the poor and weak." 23 His was a harsh and gloomy universe;
and although he knew quite well that playing the game "according to
the rules" gave judges great leeway, he was unwilling to make the
mental leap into considerations of justice and fair play.
The modern, albeit publicly unacknowledged, conception is that of
Justice Hugo L. Black, a man whose cosmology made him an inheritor
of the ideals of the Enlightenment. He saw in the Court-not consistently, to be sure, but often-a means whereby something more than the
nebulous Holmesian rules could be employed. In 1959, I had an opportunity to speak with him in his chambers in the Marble Palace. The
room was piled high with books, almost cascading off his desk, most of
which dealt with philosophy and history and economics rather than
with law as a technical doctrine. Black, a gracious man, spent an hour
discussing the work of the Court and his role. With some reluctance, I
finally got up to leave, for he obviously was a busy and hard-working
man. As we walked to the door, I turned and shook his hand, and asked
a final question: "What, sir, do you conceive your basic task to be?" I
don't know what I expected, but what came back was this: his eyes
blazed, his right hand shot into the air, and without hesitation he fervently said, "To do justice!"
It would be wrong, of course, to infer too much about either episode. Black's answer to my question, nonetheless, does seem to epitomize the Court's new jurisprudence, the open desire, not always followed, to do justice or achieve fairness in individual cases-and thus to
promulgate a general norm (or norms) of justice as fairness. It is not
an invariable practice. At times some members of the present Supreme
Court proceed in the opposite direction.
Justice William Rehnquist is perhaps Holmes' intellectual heir in
his attitude.24 Consider in this connection Rummel,25 decided by a bare
5-4 majority in 1980. In an opinion written by Rehnquist, a Texas law
was upheld that made a life sentence mandatory when a person was
convicted of three felonies. Texas' criminal law is notoriously harsh.
Rummel's three offenses involved a total sum of $229.11 (forgery,
23. Id.
24. For Justice Rehnquist's views, see Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976). For early discussion of Rehnquist's ideology, see
Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A PreliminaryView, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293 (1976).
25. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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wrongful use of a credit card, and not fulfilling an air-conditioning contract). The life sentence, Rehnquist concluded, was not a cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Maintaining
that he was proceeding according to the rules and that the relevant rule
was the Texas law, Rehnquist forgot (or simply ignored the fact) that
the rule-the Texas law-was the very question at issue.
Most Justices today do not pretend, as did Rehnquist, that constitutional law is a game to be played-in Holmes' words--"according to
the rules." Unabashedly making law, they often seem to strain for the
"just" result. The problem is that no one, on the High Bench or elsewhere, has yet produced a workable definition of justice in the context
of Supreme Court law-making. Hence sharp splits develop on the
Court, as in Rummel, and as in the well-known decision concerning
Allan Bakke's application for admission to the University of California
medical school. 26 The school had a policy of preferential admissions for
blacks and other disadvantaged people. When Bakke got to the Marble
Palace, the Justices again narrowly split, and produced a Solomonic
decision: Bakke would be admitted to the school, but race could be
used as one of the criteria for future admissions. The net result was
that white Americans (represented by Bakke) as well as black Americans (the disadvantaged generally) were each given at least a partial
victory. My point is not to argue the pros and cons of Bakke, but to
suggest that it, and others, reveal a marked propensity even in the Burger Court to follow Justice Black's cri de coeur: "Do justice!"
By no means is telocracy, avowedly pursuing a given goal and doing justice, publicly admitted by the High Bench. The pretense still
exists that Holmes' prescription of nomocracy prevails. A failure to see
through the pretense, accepting at face value what the Justices say in
their opinions, impairs detection of reality and at times leads learned
scholars into serious errors of judgment. Bertrand de Jouvenel, the
well-known French political theorist, is an example:
Nomocracy is the supremacy of the law; telocracy is the supremacy
of purpose. Modern institutions [i.e., Western] were developed
around the central concept of law. Individual security is assured if
the citizens are not exposed to arbitrary acts of the government,
26.

University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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but only to the application of the law, which they know. . . The
guarantees of such a regime are precious. But institutions of a judi27
cial type are not [designed] for action.
He went on to say that what "distinguished contemporary government
is its vocation for rapid social and economic progress. . . .Once government activity has a relatively precise goal, the regime's inspiration is
telocratic and political forms necessarily reflect this.128
De Jouvenel was not speaking of the Supreme Court of the United
States, but his views are nonetheless relevant. They display a faith in
nomocracy, in "the supremacy of law." That supremacy, however, has
never existed in the United States (or elsewhere).29 He doubtless was
correct in describing contemporary government, but surely he erred in
asserting that it was a new development. Telocracy is novel only in the
express acknowledgement of it by all branches of government. Law in
America since the earliest colonial days has been instrumental, i.e.,
goal-seeking or telocratic. Professor Morton Horwitz's conclusions
about the common law are equally accurate for constitutional law:
By 1820 the legal landscape in America bore only the faintest
resemblance to what existed forty years earlier. While the words
were often the same, the structure of thought had dramatically
changed and with it the theory of law. Law was no longer conceived of as an eternal set of principles expressed in custom and
derived from the natural law. Nor was it regarded primarily as a
body of rules designed to achieve justice only in the individual case.
Instead, judges came to think of the common law as equally responsible with legislation for governing society and promoting socially desirable conduct. The emphasis on law as an instrument of
policy encouraged innovation and allowed judges to formulate legal

27.

de Jouvenel, quoted in Kelly, Who Needs A Theory of Citizenship?, 108
No. 4, at 21, 25 (Fall 1979).
28. Id.
29. In making this statement, I am referring in the main to the highest levels of
government, although it must be noted that most administrators have some discretion.
For a statement by a knowledgable Washington lawyer, see C. HORSKY, THE WASHINGTON LAWYER 68 (1952).
DAEDALUS
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doctrine with the self-conscious goal of bringing about social
0
change."

That statement, particularly the last sentence, describes remarkably
well what the Supreme Court and other courts have been doing for at
least a generation.
The change, thus, is not from nomocracy to telocracy, but in the
recent open avowal of pursuit of social goals by officers in all segments
of government. Congress, for example, by enacting the Employment
Act of 1946,31 expressly called for policies that furthered the economic
well-being of the people. Other statutes have delegated authority to
agencies and bureaus to help fulfill that very purpose. The President's
annual budget and economic messages to Congress are a conscious effort to tinker with the economy for telocratic purposes. And the Supreme Court has had a major role in the new (open) posture-first, by
validating new powers of Congress in socio-economic affairs (the socalled constitutional revolution of the 1930s); and second, by rendering
decisions that are themselves telocratic. "It is of the very nature of a
free society," Justice Felix Frankfurter once maintained, "to advance
in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right."3 2 Today, it is
deemed reasonable and right, even necessary, for all branches of government to pursue social welfare ends. The pretenses of the past have
been cast aside. Law has become obviously instrumental. To be sure,
disagreement occurs (at this writing, for example, in the details of
President Ronald Reagan's economic programs); but it, at least outwardly, is about means rather than ends. Very few dispute that government has some role to play in socio-economic affairs; even the Reagan
"supply-side" economics is being promoted as a means of helping all of
the people (not just the affluent, who would be the immediate
beneficiaries).
The legal theory for the new posture was suggested many years
ago by Leon Duguit: "Any system of public law can be vital only so far
as it is based on a given sanction to the following rules: First, the hold30. M.

HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

1780-1860, at 30

(1977).
DOM

31. 60 Stat. 23 (1946). For discussion, see E.
(1958).
32.

RosTow, PLANNING FOR FREE-

Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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ers of power cannot do certain things; second, there are certain things
they must do."' 33 Formal constitutional law from 1789 to 1937 evolved
for the most part around the "cannot do" of that formulation, making
the Constitution one of "rights" or of "limitations." Since 1937, the
"must do" aspect has been slowly emerging.
When the Court validated the New Deal in the 1930s and '40s, it
confirmed, rather than wrought, a revolution in American government.
The High Bench caught up with the political branches of government.
Each branch became an active participant in the travail of society- At
first, the Justices were not fully aware of what they were doing; but the
new form of government-the emergence of an operative Constitution
of Powers 3 -- quickly made it evident that not even judges could stay
aloof from or forever block the tides of social change sweeping through
the nation. Writing in 1908, Woodrow Wilson perceived the need for a
common purpose among those who govern. Once it is conceded, as
surely it must be, that courts are an integral part of the governing process, then his comment is particularly apt: "Government is not a body
of blind forces; it is a body of men, with highly differentiated functions,
no doubt, in our modern day of specialization, but with a common task
and purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their warfare fatal."3 5
Although Wilson was speaking of the President and Congress, his observation fits the Supreme Court as well. Judges are not so much independent from other branches of government as they are cooperators
with them. Rather than being separate and apart, they stand squarely
in the mainstream of politics. And that is so whether their actions lend
legitimacy to politicians' goals, or quitely enable the political process to
continue, or even impede some actions of political officers by declaring
those invalid. Judges have an ongoing political function to perform.
An understanding of the flow of constitutional decisions, from the
Supreme Court and elsewhere, requires inquiry into trends of doctrinal
development in both the formal and the operative Constitutions. Trend
analysis involves starting in the past, discussing interim developments,
and projecting into the future. That can be done on several levels: the
33. L. DUGUIT, LAW IN THE MODERN STATE 26 (H. Laski trans. 1919).
34. So labelled by E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR
STATE (1951).
35.

W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56-57

(1908).
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evolution of specific constitutional principles, the structure of government itself, and the relationship of government vis-a-vis the citizenry.
The last is our present focus.
The fundamental trend, as has been said, is from ostensible
nomocracy to avowed telocracy. In politics, the change is from the negative, nightwatchman State to the positive State; in economics, it is
from laissez-faire to regulation "in the public interest," and in law, the
rule of law has been redefined from a seemingly static system of immutable principles to a dynamic, open-ended stream of decisions. Each
change merits discussion, not separately but together.
Less than a half-century ago the American people crossed over one
of the great constitutional watersheds of their history. In what was
aptly termed a constitutional revolution, judicial approval was accorded
to what most people wanted: governmental intervention in socio-economic affairs so as to provide-at least, attempt to provide-minimum
economic security. The positive State came into existence under a third
operative fundamental law-the Constitution of Powers. Government
overtly became responsible for more than minimum internal order and
external security; it assumed obligations of a social-service or welfare
nature.
Whether the new commitments of government can long endure is
by no means certain. Its politics, seemingly settled in the post-World
War II period, are becoming unravelled. That may be attributed to the
slowing down, even cessation, of economic growth, to the depletion of
natural resources, and to the rising demands of people in the former
colonial areas of the world. It comes as no surprise that our welfare
programs precipitate tensions verging on violence. We are witnessing,
in John Kenneth Galbraith's terms, the "revolt of the rich against the
poor" 36 as a type of counter-revolution to the increasingly insistent demands of the underclass (both in the United States and elsewhere).
Professor Lester Thurow has labelled the new politics "the zero-sum
society, ' 37 by which he means that in a slow or no-growth economy any
important economic benefit for one segment of society requires a concomitant sacrifice elsewhere. Hence the zero-sum game: it is one in
which all cannot win. "In the past," Thurow says, "political and eco36.
37.

Galbraith, How to Get Ahead, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS 12, 14 (July 19, 1979).
L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/2

12

Miller: The Supreme Court in a New Role: From Negative Naysayer to Affirm
6:1981

The Court as Affirmative Commander

13

1981
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nomic power was distributed in such a way that substantial economic
losses could be imposed on parts of the population. .

.

. Economic

losses were allocated to particular powerless groups rather than spread
across the population. These groups are no longer willing to accept
losses and are able to raise substantially the costs for those who wish to
impose losses upon them.""8 The groups include blacks and other ethnic
minorities, workers, women and consumers. But business interests remain powerful; the result is a creeping political paralysis. Whether and
how that Gordian knot of the American political economy can be-cut
may well be the central constitutional question of the day.
Galbraith and Thurow, without doubt, are correct. Their message
is well worth pondering, for what they say is that the telocracy that has
characterized government for the past several decades may no longer
be possible. The economic pie is shrinking; of that there can be no real
question. Even so, whatever the outcome of struggles already begun
and certain to continue, the commitment of government to general economic security remains. Congress still sets the broad policy guidelines,
their administration is left to the bureaucracy, and the judiciary cooperates. How long that posture will continue is uncertain. One thing,
however, seems sure: there will be no reversion to the status quo ante,
to the Golden Age of the 1945-1970 period. Americans are entering the
age of limits, of frugality, of scarcity. The ecological trap is closing.
There can be little doubt that the next decade and beyond will be "a
harsher, more exacting, and more perilous age."3 9
Telocratic goals pursued by government may well have to change.
I do not propose to discuss the point further, save in the context of
Supreme Court decision-making. The social milieu is being rapidly altered. Does that mean that the instrumentalism of the Justices, so evident since 1937, will be altered so that different goals are pursued?
Can human dignity, defined as the realization of basic human needs,
survive and be enhanced in a "steady-state" economy? Can, in other
words, the Court help effect the transition from the now-defunct
Golden Age to "the lean years"'40 with a minimum of stress on existing
38. Id. at 12.
39. P. DUIGNAN & A. RABUSHKA, THE UNITED
(1980).
40. See R. BARNET, THE LEAN YEARS (1980).
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institutions and expectations? These are the problems that now face all
governmental officers, including those in the Temple on the Hill,
problems with which they will continue to be concerned as the future
unfolds. No quick technological fix, nor any other similar remedy, is
available. We are in for it, deeply and irretrievably; and it behooves all
who care-and only saints and fools do not-to help in the extrication
of humankind from the crisis of crises-the climacteric-it now confronts. Judges cannot be immune from that effort.
The problem emerges at the very time that the Rule of Law,
historically nomocratic, is being redefined to encompass a telocratic
dimension. Constitutional law was traditionally procedural, telling
government how it must deal with the citizenry. It has now taken on
enough of a goal- or purpose-seeking aspect to conclude that nomocracy is no longer an adequate conception of the role of law and
legal institutions. This is not to say that none of the traditional view
remains; of course it does. But it must operate side-by-side with the
new instrumentalism. The United States, thus, has assumed the task,
vastly more difficult than merely enforcing a law known to all (the orthodoxy), of deciding what the law ought to be and of making desirable
changes.4
Perhaps the clearest expression of the new Rule of Law came in
1959, in the Declaration of Delhi of the International Congress of Jurists (a group of lawyers from countries outside the Soviet bloc of nations): "The International Congress of Jurists

.

. recognizes that the

Rule of Law is a dynamic concept for the expansion and fulfillment of
which jurists are primarily responsible and which should be employed
not only to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the
individual in a free society, but also to establish social, economic, educationaland cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations
and dignity may be realized. ' 42 To the extent that the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Declaration is accepted, (and it is by a wide range of
American governmental programs) the Rule of Law has come to mean,
See Knight, On the Meaning of Justice, in JUSTICE 1 (NoMos VI: YEARFriedrich & J. Chapman eds. 1963).
42. INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (N. Marsh ed. 1960) (emphasis added). See Thorson, A New Concept of the
Rule of Law, 38 CAN. B. REV. 239 (1960).
41.

BOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY)(C.
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in Aristotle's terms, distributive justice as well as corrective justice.
Government, as Duguit said, "must do" certain things of an affirmative
nature.
How, if at all, has the Supreme Court responded to that version of
the Rule of Law? The Justices, in the first place, have not announced
any spectacular shift in so many words. However, when some of their
recent decisions are viewed in terms of effects, of social consequences,
rather than as examples of doctrinal exegesis, it may be said that the
Court has indeed accepted at least some parts of the new Rule of Law.
Furthermore, it has contributed to the settlement of some immediate
aims of Americans. Yves Simon once observed that in a democratic
society, "deliberation is about means and presupposes that the problem
of ends has been settled. '43 The Justices have contributed to developing
consensuses on such troublous matters as race relations, 4 abortion,' 5
the church-state relationship, 46 the immersion of the nation in world
affairs,' 7 and other critical public policy issues. 8 I do not suggest that
they have solved them. They have not. In those and other areas, the
Justices have moved to catch the conscience of the American people,
and thus to stimulate and keep alive a continuing seminar on vital constitutional matters. If democracy means anything, it means a continuing dialogue among the citizenry on matters of public concern. The
Justices both lead and participate in that dialogue.
The precise turning point to constitutional telocracy can be identified in Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes' 1937 opinion in a minimum-wage case, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.4 9 To Hughes, liberty
meant "liberty in a social organization" which used the law to ward
away the evils of industrialization. From being a limitation on governmental power, the due process clauses of the formal Constitution became at least an invitation, and perhaps a command, for political ac-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Y. SIMON, PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 123 (1951).
E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and progeny.
E.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and progeny.
E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, U.S. _, 101 S. Ct. 2972 (1981).

48. Not that the Court has escaped criticism. Far from it. More than 20 bills
were introduced in Congress in 1981 aimed at cutting down Supreme Court power. See
Miller, The Supreme Court Under Fire, Miami Herald, June 28, 1981, at 4E, col. 1.

49.

300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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tion to ameliorate human distress. The command, if such, was couched
in discreet terms, and the idea lay dormant for almost twenty years.
Not until 1955, in the second, implementing decision in Brown v.
Board of Education, did the Justices screw up their courage to tell the
other government officers: "Do this." In that instance, the command
was to integrate black children into public schools "with all deliberate
speed."
Hughes' opinion in Parrishpermitted government to actively further the cause of the disadvantaged-that is, to use law purposively. It
also, as Professor Edward S. Corwin phrased it, changed the due process clauses from limitations on legislative power to "an actual instigation to legislative action of a leveling character." 50 At what point does
an "instigation" become a command? There is no way to answer that
question. At some time, however, between 1937 and 1955, a new perception of their role was accepted by the Justices.
The Parrishdecision, with others, permitted the birth of what I
call the (third) Constitution of Powers, for the Court had constitutionalized massive interventions into the political economy by Congress and
state legislatures. That third fundamental law still remains as part of
the operative Constitution; it is a layer on the palimpsest that is the
Document of 1787. It was not that the (second) Constitution of Rights
(of Quasi-limitations) was completely shunted aside and supplanted; it
now had to share top billing with the third Constitution. (A fourth fundamental law-the Constitution of Control is now becoming visible.)5

III
It is. "an axiom of statesmanship," Henry George once observed,
"that great changes can best be brought about under old forms. 52 So
with the formal words of the Constitution: they remain the same, but
only as a facade, beneath which lies a radically different living reality.
50.

E.

CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT

161 (1948) (emphasis omit-

ted).
51. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981); Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of
Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1980).
52. H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 404-05 (1879).
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The emergence of a Constitution of Powers meant that structural
changes came without amendment of the Constitution of Rights. Two
of them are well known: the shift in the federal system toward a consolidation of national power, and increased flow of power within the general government toward the presidency (and the bureaucracy). Nor was
this a sudden development. Much of American history evidences the
low beginnings of both changes. By 1950 it had become clear beyond
doubt that both were permanent alterations in the allocation of governmental powers. (That is so despite some recent attempts, as in the 1976
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,53 to resurrect historical
federalism.)
I do not propose to discuss either federalism or the rise of executive hegemony here. My interest lies in what has happened and is happening to the Supreme Court. The Justices have moved on several
fronts to meet the challenges of the modern era. They have not remained quiescent, but have become active participants in the arena of
politics. Examples are easily found: racial segregation; apportionment
in state legislatures (and in the U.S. House of Representatives); the
rights of women, aliens, children and illegitimates; administration of
the criminal law. Taken together, they tend to validate, at least partially, McGeorge Bundy's comment that "The fundamental function of
the law is to prevent the natural unfairness of society from becoming
intolerable.""M The core of many recent decisions of the Court is the
equality principle, writ large, and a concept of justice as fundamental
fairness.
Under its new jurisprudence, the Supreme Court acts as a commander, not in the sense of having enforcement power of its own
(which it does not), but by stating norms that purportedly bind the
entire nation. By becoming a commander, and getting away with it, the
Justices have assumed an even larger role. What that might be is suggested elsewhere.5 5 Suffice it for now to state that the Court as legislator is now well, if not fully, accepted. People throughout the United
States look to the Temple on the Hill for guidance, if not for ultimate
53. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
54. Quoted in M. MAYER, supra note 20, at 516.
55. See, e.g., Miller, In Defense of Judicial Activism, in SUPREME COURT AcTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds.) (to be published in 1982); A.
Miller, supra note *,ch. 11.
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resolution, in some of the more troublous problems they confront.
Anguished protests come, of course, from those whose oxen have been
gored by the very idea of the Court as commander, protests not unlike
those suffered by Chief Justice Marshall. They too will fade away. The
Justices' position as a necessary constituent of government is too solidified to be altered. The Court is needed, badly needed, by the fragmented and alienated populace trying to navigate the white rapids of
the climacteric of humankind lying dead ahead. I do not suggest, now
or later, that the Court can or will do this alone. That, of course, is a
manifest impossibility. But the Justices can light a candle rather than
standing aside and cursing the darkness of the coming Age of
Frugality.
IV
The new judicial posture built in the last generation or so revolves
around the concept of "positive freedom." To explain it requires reference to a long forgotten English philosopher, Thomas Hill Green, who
wrote in the latter part of the nineteenth century. To him, the notion of
positive freedom reflected the rediscovery of the community as a corporate body of which both institutions and individuals were a part, so that
the idea of collective well-being or the common good would underlie
any claim to private right. Ponder that idea for a moment. Can there
be much doubt that claims to private right do give way, under modern
law and policy, to ideas of collective well-being? The community has
indeed been rediscovered. It may be seen in the rise of the State to preeminence, in the successful assertions of national security as justifications for governmental action, in invocations of the public (or national)
interest by successive Presidents, in the "entitlements" that more and
more Americans consider to be their right. In all these, and more, the
notion of individual autonomy has been supplanted by an inchoate collectivism. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, few dispute the need
for the change, and fewer would wish to revert to the storied days of
individualism, (which existed more in myth than in reality). It should
be remembered that individualism, far from being inherent in the
human experience, is a latter-day phenomenon, no older than the
French Revolution. Even as a theory or philosophy it is now either dead
or dying both in social affairs and in law. The autonomous man does
not exist as such.
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The development is reflected in American constitutionalism in the
newly-emergent concept of status rights which derive from one's membership in a group (or groups) and not from some inherent, metaphysical notion of personhood. 5 An "indivisible" nation pledges "liberty and
justice to all." That may be a mere slogan, a symbol, but we must
always remember that,
as Holmes said and Frankfurter often repeated,
"we live by symbols. ' 57 The symbol today is of collective well-being, of
welfare if you will. Green gave the philosophical basis for positive government: social insurance programs that provide the economic means
for more people to be free (if they wish). The duty of government in
this conception is not so much to maximize individual liberty as an end
in itself, but rather "to insure the conditions for at least a minimum of
well-being-a standard of living, of education, and of security below
which good policy requires that no considerable part of the population
' Analysis of governmental programs since the
shall be allowed to fall."58
1930s shows how closely they approximate that requirement. And one
need only refer to the Declaration of Delhi59 to see how some legal
thinking coincides with Green's. It must be remembered, however, that
Green wrote at a time when the economic growth seemed to make his
proposals possible. The history of most of this century is also one of
economic growth. Modern governmental programs were created during
an age of abundance, well before the incipient age of frugality, and
thus well before Thurow's zero-sum society became apparent. That, of
course, makes the task of today's government immensely more difficult.
It is a task, furthermore, that has lately encountered serious intellectual opposition from neo-conservatives generally and from such articulate wishful thinkers as philosopher Robert Nozick and economist
George Gilder. 60 Both Nozick and Gilder want to create what they
fancy was the world of yesteryear-a free market, non-statist society-or failing that, to move toward that end. That they cannot and
will not succeed should be obvious to all.
56. See Phillips, supra note 7.
57. For Holmes, see 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 270 (1920); for
Frankfurter, see H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 148 (1981).

58.

G.

59.
60.

See text accompanying note 42 supra.
See R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,

SABINE,

A

HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY
AND

676 (1937).

UTOPIA

(1974);

G.

GILDER,

WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981).
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No one in government, certainly no Justice, has ever openly
avowed that Green was the patron saint of the Constitution of Powers.
Indeed, it would have been odd had anyone done so. Green was an
obscure academic scribbler, little known outside of England. His ideas,
however, have percolated through other, perhaps lesser minds to be
seized by men of action who never heard of him and who had no interest in abstract ideas as such. But unquestionably Green's views on freedom as a social, not individual, right are dominant. He wished to reunite the individual with the social order of which he is a member, and
without which his existence has no meaning. Green saw that individualism was running its course, a temporary phenomenon limited in time
and space to a few centuries and the Western world. He also knew that
organizations-the collective body, including the nation itself-were
the new order. Therefore, the individual's freedom is, paradoxically to
some, protected by legal and other institutions that can only be provided by the community. We have thus outlived the Robinson Crusoe
myth. "When we speak of freedom as something to be so highly
prized," asserted Green, "we mean a positive capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing and enjoying, and that, too, something
that we do or enjoy in common with others. We mean by it a power
which each man exercises through the help or security given him by his
fellow men, and which he in turn helps to secure for them."61 In a
phrase, that is a formula for benevolent collectivism-precisely where
Americans are now, at least in the ideal. The ideal, to be sure, has not
been achieved for many; with the incipient age of frugality, perhaps
even fewer will achieve it.
Has the Supreme Court lived up to Green's conception? Only indirectly, as the following examples illustrate. Taken together, the Court's
decisions display a marked tendency toward overt telocracy on implicit
Green lines. Their numbers may be small, but they are of fundamental
significance, both because they reveal beyond doubt a new and significant role of the Justices and because they are the principal targets of
the Court's modern critics. To generalize, these illustrations show that
the Court is willing for the first time in American history to give con61.

T. GREEN,

WORKS: MISCELLANIES AND MEMOIR

371-72 (1888). See Phillips,

Thomas Hill Green, Positive Freedom and The United States Supreme Court, 25
EMORY

L.J. 63 (1976).
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stitutional protection to some members of certain "discrete and insular" minorities.6 2 Thus, the Constitution has been extended substantially, but still not completely to "We, the people .

,"

the opening

words of the Preamble.
Race Relations
The Negro problem, Gunnar Myrdal maintained in his classic An
American Dilemma (1940), is really a problem in the hearts of white
Americans. Except for a brief period, from about the mid-1940s to the
late 1960s, whites have been quite willing to keep blacks in either a
formal or an informal caste system. When slavery was abolished by the
Thirteenth Amendment, the First Reconstruction began. It met an
early death, first in politics and then by judicial decrees limiting Congress' power to enforce the Civil War amendments. In the infamous
Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896,63 the Justices legitimated a caste
system, wrapping it in the sugar-coating of "separate but equal," even
though everyone knew that blacks were in fact separate and unequal.
Under the operative Constitution, blacks were kept "in their place."
Peonage was widespread, a form of bondage scarcely distinguishable
from slavery.
That could not last, at least in formal law. No nation that trumpets itself as a democracy with "equal justice for all" 6 4 can indefinitely
keep a large part of the populace submerged in a status providing little
hope, except for an occasional fortunate escapee, of a better future. But
last it did until the Second World War. The United States, like Great
Britain, could hardly conscript men to fight, and at times die, in the
name of freedom and democracy, only to return them to ghettoes at the
end of hostilities. Nor could blacks be further denied an opportunity for
education and thus for fuller participation in American life. Moreover,
blacks not called into service could not be denied employment in war
industries; this led to President Roosevelt's executive order barring ra62. The term comes from the Carolene Productscase and Justice Stone's famous
footnote therein. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.- 144, 153 n.4 (1938). For
discussion, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 76 (1980).
63. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

64. This is the slogan carved deeply in the facade of the Supreme Court building
in Washington, D.C.
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cial discrimination in employment. 5 FDR, a true Machiavellian, made
a virtue out of necessity.6"
The main breakthroughs for improving the status of America's
"untouchables" came in the Supreme Court-in the White Primary
Cases,67 in Shelley v. Kraemer6 8 and then in Brown v. Board of Education.69 The facade of constitutional law has not been the same since.
Others taking their cue from black Americans made the Court an object of pressure-group tactics. The reach of the equality principle has
been extended to other areas. The Supreme Court, supposedly dispassionate, became compassionate. Men, women, and children, with little
or no political influence, found through the judiciary a way to redress
longfelt grievances. Federal appeals Judge J. Skelly Wright said it well:
After pointing out that "great social and political problems [are better]
resolved in the political arena," he went on to say "there are social and
political problems which seem at times to defy such resolution. In such
situations, under our system, the judiciary must bear a hand and accept
its responsibility to assist in the solution where constitutional rights
hang in the balance. '70 We have already mentioned that the Justices
used express language of affirmative duty in the late 1960s in an effort
to eliminate racial discrimination root and branch. What remains for
blacks is not the principle found in the formal Constitution, but one
based on cases and the operative Constitution. The Court may promulgate a general norm-a rule of law-but unless it is accepted and
obeyed by people generally it tends to become, if not a dead letter, less
and less significant.
Until they decided that discriminatory motive or intent was not
only important but had to be proved by those alleging discrimination,
the Justices had been remarkably consistent in furthering the cause of
human dignity for black Americans. The basic change, subtle but important, surfaced in 1976 but was underscored in 1980 in City of Mo65. For discussion, see Miller, Government Contracts and Social Control:A Preliminary Inquiry, 41 VA. L. REV. 27 (1955).
66. N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES, Book I, Sec. 9: "A republic or a prince
should ostensibly do out of generosity what necessity constrains them to do."
67. E.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
68. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
70. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 517 (D.D.C. 1967).
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bile v. Bolden.71 In Bolden, black citizens of Mobile, comprising onethird of the city's population, argued that their vote was unconstitutionally diluted because of the city's at-large system of electing the three
city commissioners who governed the city. The system, established in
1911, kept blacks from effective political participation. Six separate
opinions were filed; Justice Potter Stewart, speaking for a plurality, rejected the claims. Adverse action on an identifiable group was not
enough, said Stewart; there must be proof that a challenged action was
undertaken "at least in part 'because of', not merely 'in spite of', its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group. '72 Professor Aviam Soifer
ably summed up the implications:
It is as if in 1980 black citizens no longer constitute a discrete
and insular minority. A black citizen's constitutional claim will not
prevail unless he can demonstrate precise intentional discrimination
against himself as an individual or some specific and intentional
official discriminatory treatment of blacks. Otherwise, the promise
of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and the civil rights
revolution, has either been satisfied or is properly left to the politicians. As we enter the 1980s, it is presumed that we all compete
fairly. When no bad guys can be connected to evil discriminatory
deeds, the Court apparently
simply assumes that we all enjoy equal
73
and fair opportunity.
The Bolden decision, then, made the Court, as Justice Thurgood Marshall said in dissent, an accessory to the perpetuation of racial discrimination. His point is well taken. How could Stewart and others who upheld the Mobile system not have seen what should be obvious to all?
The meaning, for black Americans, seems clear beyond doubt: the
formal Constitution is merging with the operative fundamental law.
Under both, the blacks are slowly reverting to second-class citizenship.
Under the living law of American constitutionalism, the promise of
Brown v. Board of Education and progeny has not been realized. Ghettoes remain and unemployment among blacks is highest in the nation.
71. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
72. Id. at 71 n.17. See Soifer, Complacency and Constitutional Law, 42 Omio
ST. L.J. 383 (1981).
73. Soifer, supranote 72, at 389. See Miller, The Court and Racial Bias, Miami
Herald, May 24, 1981, at 1E, col. 1.
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Blacks do not receive, as in Mobile, their fair share of city services. As
for unemployment, one study concluded: "These data fail to provide
support for the popular belief that there has been a significant increase
in the proportion of middle and upper-income Black families in recent
years. If anything, these findings suggest that the proportion of such
families may in fact have declined, that the economic gains of many
blacks may have eroded under the combined effects of inflation and
recession. '"" Many whites want to believe the contrary, but the facts do
not bear them out. While a larger number of blacks have been able to
gain economic and social rewards, most do not, and they are joined by
ever-increasing numbers of Hispanics and poor whites.
The social consequences may well be considerable. Will blacks and
other disadvantaged groups long acquiesce to a condition of operative
apartheid and a growing willingness of the Supreme Court to uphold
it? Justice Marshall ended his dissent in Bolden with a warning that
may be prophetic: He said that a "superficial tranquility" created by
"impermeable" and "specious" requirements that discriminatory intent
must be proven may be short-lived. "If this Court," he concluded, "refuses to honor our long-recognized principles that the Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination,' it
cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect political channels
of seeking redress. '75 Indeed, it cannot. When political avenues are
barred and the Supreme Court does not respond, is there any way victims can peacefully work within "the system"? None is apparent.
I do not wish to push the point further at this time. It is enough
now to say that the Court's new posture-issuing commands of affirmative duty-poses difficult and as yet unanswered questions. But for
blacks at least, the Court's stance is by no means a one-way street. The
public at large may not disagree with the Court as commander; but
scholars, commentators, and judges themselves have not answered
many questions. Where does the Court get its constitutional right to
issue general rules? How will the rules be enforced? Is the President,
constitutionally charged with the duty of assuring that the laws are
74. Hill, The Illusion of Black Progress,9 Soc. PoL'Y, No. 3, 14, 24 (1978).
See Miller, Brown's 25th: A Silver Lining Tarnished With Time, 3 DISTRIcT Law. No.
5, -,
22 (1979).

75.

446 U.S. at 141.
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faithfully executed, also under a duty to "execute" the decisions of the
Court? Are Supreme Court decisions of the same rank as a statute so
far as Article VI of the Constitution is concerned (making the Constitution, laws and treaties the supreme law of the land, binding judges in
every state)?
As for the President, if he has a duty to execute judicial decrees, is
it merely moral or political; or does it go further, carrying the implication that someone can go into court to make him enforce a judicial
decision? Recall that in Cooper v. Aaron,7 6 the Court maintained that
its decisions are "the law of the land. 17 If that means what it says,
then a Supreme Court decision is akin to a statute under Article VI,
and the logical implication is that the President must enforce the decision. Even though the writ of the Court can now run against the President (as in the Nixon Tapes Case),7 8 no one has yet tried to trigger the
Court to order the President to carry out that duty. The short answer
to the question is that, at best, it is an unsettled constitutional question;
at worst, no one can get the Court to act.
Another question is this: if the Court decision is "law," can someone, not a litigant before the Court, be held in contempt of court for
not obeying the asserted general norm? The immediate litigants certainly can, for the Court's statement of a general norm is a specific
decree aimed at them. Legal theory, however, does not at present make
it a crime, nor does it make a person defying the Court subject to contempt charges, even though he may be within the scope of the actual or
"backdoor" class-action ruling. To illustrate: if the Court holds that
prayers cannot be recited in public schools in a case coming from Ohio,
by no means would school officials be subject to contempt punishment
for not adhering to it in Montana.
Nor does legal theory yet meet the challenge of federal judges acting as administrators. For example, in his sweeping mental hospital and
prison rulings in Alabama, 9 Judge Frank Johnson in effect established
76. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
77. 358 U.S. at 18. To my knowledge, this was the first time that the Court said
that in explicit terms. The decision, thus, marks the point-of departure-for the new
jurisprudence of the Court. It is unique, in that it is the only opinion in Supreme Court
history that was individually signed by all nine Justices.
78. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
79. These are the well-known decisions in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
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himself as de facto head of both systems, telling state officials to rectify
admitted grievances on pain of emptying the hospitals and jails. Those
decisions pose crucial questions about the power of federal judges, but
are beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to note that Johnson's
orders are the logical extension of the role of the Supreme Court as
commander.
As the Justices continue their open acknowledgment of their new
role, those and other questions will have to be answered. Judicial power
has been enhanced. Perhaps, however, mounting criticism of the Supreme Court and an increasing awareness of the intractability of many
questions may cause the Justices to pull back. They have done so, as
noted above, in some cases involving black Americans, but not in others
such as the Solomonic decision in Bakke and the decisions sustaining
"'affirmative action" in employment cases.80 The Court is developing a
new constituency-the "great unwashed" of the populace. Whether
that new base of support will allow the Court to strike out and recognize claims for human dignity depends, however, upon whether those
who are the ultimate (albeit hidden) beneficiaries of judicial action-the elites of the nation-are sufficiently acute to perceive that
human rights decisions are in their interests also. On that score one
should not be sanguine. What Gandhi called his greatest problem-the
hardness of heart of the educated-is matched, perhaps exceeded, by
the inherent inability (bordering on stupidity) of many of the moneyed
and propertied to realize where their long-range interests can best be
served.
In final analysis, what the Court can or cannot do for blacks and
others depends on the social milieu. I have written elsewhere that the
ecological trap is closing and that Americans will be fortunate if they
are able to escape realization of Arnold Toynbee's doleful forecast. "In
all developed countries," he asserted in 1975, "a new way of life-a
severely regimented way-will have to be imposed by ruthless, authori(M.D. Ala. 1971), and Pugh v. Locke 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976). See Johnson, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979) for a statement of
Judge Johnson's judicial philosophy. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281. For discussion of the Wyatt case, see J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY

80.

115-128 (1981).

E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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tarian government." ' We can hope Toynbee was wrong, but there can
be little question that the world is moving rapidly toward a steady-state
economy; two centuries of unprecedented technological and economic
development are drawing to a close. Those two centuries-almost exactly the life span of the American republic-have left an indelible
mark on the mind of modern Americans. Many still believe in the inevitability of continuing progress, although few take the trouble to define
that ambiguous word. The Justices and the politicians will have to operate in a social context well described by economist E. J. Misham:
Modern economic growth, and the norms and attitudes it establishes, have produced a highly complex industrial and urban organization, albeit one that is increasingly vulnerable largely because the spread of affluence, the diffusion of the products and
processes of technology, and the sheer rapidity of change, have
combined, unavoidably, to undermine the influence of the complex
of institutions and myths that invested all preindustrial civilizations
with stability and cohesion. The existing libertarian order in the
West is no longer rooted in a consensus that draws its inspiration
from a common set of unquestioned beliefs. The legitimacy of all
its institutions is perpetually under assault. Social order is visibly
disintegrating.82
In some respects, Mishan is confirming Lester Thurow's idea of the
zero-sum society. There is a factor, not mentioned by either, which
when added shows that the ecological trap is not only closing but is
producing a high potential for social tension, even violence. That factor
is simply this: when the expectations of a significant group of people,
e.g., black Americans, are raised so that many believe the rhetoric of
democracy and equality, and when those expectations are dashed as
they have been for blacks, not only is the political order in disarray (as
Thurow says) but the economic system cannot meet their demands
(Mishan and Thurow). The result is a high probability of violence,
which in turn produces harsh repressive measures.
The challenge for all American political institutions is obvious: to
A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF
151 (1981), quoting Toynbee.
82. E. MISHAN, THE EcONOMIc GROWTH DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT 265 (1977).
81.

CONTROL
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develop another common set of unquestioned beliefs. It is here that the
Court can be of substantial help. Of course, the Justices cannot do it
alone. But if the disintegration of the social order that Mishan perceives is to be halted and turned around, the Justices cannot shirk participating in the task. The same sort of attitude that permitted the Supreme Court in 1954 to grasp the nettle of racial discrimination should
prevail for other polycentric social questions. Americans should demand no less from the black-robed justices who work in the Temple on
the Hill.
Legislative Reapportionment
To repeat: Brown and progeny, both judicial and legislative, successfully altered the formal Constitution and, during America's Golden
Age, the operative Constitution, because an economy of abundance
characterized the United States. With economic growth slowing or
even ending, the consensus that held the nation together since 1945 is
falling apart. The spinoffs from Brown and the legislative reapportionment cases,83 have made this disintegration both possible and inevitable. The black vote, insofar as blacks vote in a bloc, becomes of great
importance in political campaigns (particularly for the presidency).
The apportionment decisions, mandating one person/one vote, came
precisely when whites began to flee to the suburbs from the large cities.
Not by mere chance did Raoul Berger, among others, single out Brown
and Baker v. Carr,8 4 the key apportionment decision, for particularly
harsh criticism.85 Baker and its aftermath, buttressed by the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,8 6 made bloc-voting crucial in key cities. People
long bereft of political power could now make their weight felt, particularly in presidential elections where the Electoral College is still used.
(The College works only because of widespread acceptance of the no83.

E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S.

1 (1964). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, supra note 72, and articles cited in notes
72 and 73 supra.
84. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
85. R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977). See also L. CRAGLIA, DisASTER BY DECREE (1976). Berger's book is the subject of a symposium in 6 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. No. 2, at 403-662 (1979).
86. Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 1971, 1973-1973p

(1970).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/2

28

Miller: The Supreme Court in a New Role: From Negative Naysayer to Affirm
The Court as Affirmative Commander

6:1981

29 1

tion, not in accord with the intentions of the Framers, that electors vote
in accordance with the popular vote.)
Baker emanated from an especially pernicious situation in Tennessee, where the state legislature, contrary to the Tennessee Constitution,
had failed to reapportion the legislature for sixty years. That meant
that voters in rural areas had a grossly disproportionate number of representatives. After several failed attempts to have the system declared
unconstitutional, the practice became so bad as to offend a majority of
the Justices. In 1962, they ruled that an equal protection violation had
been presented. Two years later the Court went the full distance and
decreed that voting districts had to be as nearly equal in population as
possible, both for state legislatures and the federal House of Representatives.87 The principle was subsequently applied to local governments. 8
Again, a furor erupted, led by academic disciples of Justice Frankfurter, who thought the Court had not properly reasoned its decisions
and had not exercised a proper amount of self-restraint.8 9 Oddly, however, unlike the reception of Brown, the apportionment decisions have
been placidly accepted by public and politicians alike. Frankfurter
thought the voters in Tennessee could and should ask state politicians,
in effect, to vote themselves out of office. Even a federal judge who was
once a law professor should have known better. He carried his mistaken
views about judicial self-restraint to absurd lengths. Another dissenting
Justice, John M. Harlan, waxed even more choleric in 1964: he grumbled that the one person/one vote decisions "give support to a current
mistaken view

. . .

that every major social ill in this country can find

its cure in some constitutional 'principle', and that this Court should
'take the lead' in promoting reform when other branches of government
fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the
public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be
thought of as a general haven for reform movements. . . . This Court
. . .does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority even

to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of the political
process." 90
87.
88.
89.
(1970).
90.

See cases cited in note 83 supra.
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
E.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

IDEA OF PROGRESS

167

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
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That statement, to speak gently, is simply not adequate. Not only
did Harlan seek to differentiate a "judicial body" from the "political
process," which for the Supreme Court is at best fallacious, he also
asserted that his colleagues had exceeded their authority. That simply
is not true. Nowhere is it prescribed, in the Constitution, statutes, or
rules of the Supreme Court itself, what the authority of the Court is.
Since almost the beginning of the republic, that authority has been
what the Justices say it is, and what, politically, they can get away
with. Frankfurter and Harlan, furthermore, badly misread the social
tea leaves in their impassioned dissents; people have accepted the
Court's rulings on reapportionment, whether reasoned or not. Ideally, it
doubtlessly would be better if the political process were adequate to
manifest long-denied needs. But at times it is not, as Harlan conceded.
How, possibly, could he and Frankfurter have thought that politicians
would reform themselves and voluntarily give up some of their power.
Surely, Judge Wright's statement 1 is closer to the realities of the constitutional order. For present purposes, the lesson of Baker and progeny
is clear and unmistakable: they classically exemplify an affirmative
constitutional duty imposed by judges upon the political branches of
government. Since 1964 state legislatures have been restructured, at
times after a direct command from a judge. Compliance has occurred.
At this writing, another round of apportionments is taking place as a
result of the 1980 census. The rotten boroughs of the nation have been
easier to eradicate, therefore, than racial discrimination-a lesson to be
pondered when one reflects on the political power of the courts.
The suggestion here is not that the products of state legislatures
after reapportionment differ markedly from the past. It is far too simplistic to believe that legislators vote on a rural-urban split. The reapportionment decisions did little to cure the real ills of the political process. But the significance of Baker and subsequent decisions lies in the
creation by the Justices of an affirmative duty on the part of politicians
to do certain things, simply because the Justices so read the Constitution. That the Justices have prevailed is itself an important lesson in
politics as the art of the possible, a lesson that surely can be applied
elsewhere.
91. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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Other Examples
No need exists to multiply the examples where the Justices have
acted as commander. Sometimes their command is couched in permissive language, as in the 1980 decision allowing patents to be issued for
the creation of new forms of life.92 At other times, they are direct and
pointed. Miranda v. Arizona93 is an example of the latter. One of the
most criticized of all recent decisions, Miranda set forth a code of conduct for officers to follow when someone is arrested. Affirmative duties
thus were imposed on police officers throughout the nation, even though
the lawsuit nominally concerned Miranda and the state of Arizona. Miranda was important to the ruling only because, as with divers others
before and after him, he was necessary to trigger the mechanism of the
Court.
Another example is the well-known and controversial rulings in the
Abortion Cases,94 where the Court decreed that a woman had a right
to an abortion limited only by the duration of her pregnancy. A trimester system was established, under which abortions could not be
prevented during the first three months, while during the second three
months a steadily increasing societal interest in the viability of fetuses
made abortions regulable by the states. During the final three months,
abortions were permissible only in extreme circumstances. Again, a set
of general rules was promulgated; and again, the litigants were
unimportant.
Judges in both federal and state courts caught the cue from the
Supreme Court; they, too, occasionally issue commands. We have already mentioned Judge Frank Johnson's mind-boggling decrees, that
since Alabama's treatment of mental patients and prisoners violated
the Constitution, the appropriate remedy was complicated administrative procedures established by Johnson. In Boston, Judge Arthur Garrity declared the school system to be in receivership and ordered busing
92.
93.
94.

Diamond v. Chakraburty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
I happen to believe that these cases, supra note 15, were decided correctly;

and that those who criticize the Court, particularly Blackmun, J., for the reasoning in
the opinion miss the mark. Other parts of the book from which this article is derived

develop in some detail the idea of reason and its application in judicial decisionmaking.
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to achieve racial integration. 95 As for the states, an outstanding example came in New Jersey, where its supreme court ordered the legislature to enact a financing scheme to improve schools on pain of having
them closed by court order. 6
I do not suggest that Judges Johnson and Garrity or the New
Jersey Supreme Court have been able to translate their bare-bones orders into operational reality. There is a long, long road between judicial
decision and full compliance. What is important for present purposes is
to see the growing willingness of judges to actively intervene in politics
and to command obedience to judicial decrees. One can agree with Professor Nathan Glazer that "the courts truly have changed their role in
American life" and have reached deeper into the lives of people than
"they ever have in American history. ' 97 But one need not-one should
not-agree with Glazer when he maintains that this is "against the will
' Some people perhaps, but certainly it is the people
of the people."98
themselves, many of them new types of litigants (the poor, the disadvantaged, women, etc.), who are energizing the judiciary. Impotent politically, these people see judges as their final hope. Given this, activist
judges may be the final desperate hope of a crumbling system of American constitutionalism for salvation from its own inequities and inconsistencies. The litigants believe the incessant rhetoric about democracy
and the rule of law; they call upon an oligarchic judiciary to further
democratic ends. That may be a paradox, but it is the truth.

95. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974); arfd 509 F.2d 580
(Ist Cir. 1976); cert. denied, sub nom., White v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 935 (1976).
96. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973);
119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
976 (1973), modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); 67 N.J. 35, 335 A.2d 6
(1975); 67 N.J. 333, 338 A.2d 193 (1975); 69 N.J. 133, 351 A.2d 713 (1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); 69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976), 70 N.J. 155, 358
A.2d 457 (1976), modified, 70 N.J. 464, 360 A.2d 400 (1976).
97. Glazer, Towards an ImperialJudiciary, 41 PuB. INTEREST 104, 106 (1975).
98. Id. For criticism, see Miller, Judicial Activism and American Constitutionalism: Some Notes and Reflections, in CONSTITUTIONALSM 333 (Nomos XXI, J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979).
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IV
The Court as commander requires affirmative cooperation from
other governmental officers. The Justices can pronounce, but they cannot administer. Even federal judges in lower courts, such as Johnson
and Garrity, find detailed administration beyond their capacities. So
judges must trust the good will of politicians to carry out their decrees.
That means litigants, too, must trust the good will of politicians. No
doubt it would be better were that not true. Many officers who should
administer the law of the land as stated by the Court, do not; they are
reluctant and often defiant. Even with the best of intentions, which
doubtless many have, administrators also must contend with possible
public disapproval.
That has an important effect. The Supreme Court interprets the
Constitution but politicians, bureaucrats and lower-court judges interpret the Court. Those entrusted with administration ofttimes apply obscure commands. In so doing, they have considerable discretion. This
has long been known, but seldom analyzed in depth. Few have inquired
into the extent of compliance with the Supreme Court's rulings. Judicial opinions do not enforce themselves. In a widely-quoted statement,
Bishop Hoadly said: "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret
any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all
intents and purposes, and not the person who first spoke or wrote
them." 99 The Justices may have "absolute authority" to interpret the
Constitution, but those interpretations must be transmuted into operational reality by literally tens of thousands of other governmental officers who were not before the bar of the Court.
Compliance, thus, often is chancy, especially so when Court opinions are written in opaque language. The Justices, moreover, cannot
possibly predict all of the factual situations that might arise in which
their general norms are applied. Nor can they expect those who are
affected by administrative actions to be aware of what the Court has
said. Ambiguity in pronouncement plus uncertainty in application
makes for uneven administration. Even in the best of circumstances,
lawyers are adept at distinguishing cases, showing that factual situa99.
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tions differ in significant ways, to evade even unambiguous judicial decrees. Furthermore, constitutional decisions tend to produce new claims
and thus new litigation, with the net result that constitutional law has
become a lawyer's paradise-a fertile area for more and more work for
more and more attorneys. The truly fundamental principles of American constitutionalism are being lost in a swamp of thousands of judicial
rulings; the Supreme Court alone has produced some 450 fat volumes
of reports, all of which are kept in law libraries and computerized files.
To summarize, freedom in the United States is as much positive as
negative in nature. For a person to have freedom to participate and to
attain goals central to the concept of human dignity he must have freedom both from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power and from
inadequate social conditions that make it unlikely he can achieve that
level. Courts do help, albeit imperfectly, in dispensing justice. Their
fundamental task now is to help create something wholly new: a Constitution of Human Needs.100
Why judges, some may ask? The short answer is that, as political
as well as judicial officers, they cannot avoid the swirls and currents
engulfing the body politic. Why not legislators and administrators, including the President? The short answer is that the system of governance established by the Constitution is not suited to the demands of our
era. It worked well, by hindsight at least, during the nineteenth and
first part of the twentieth centuries. Today, however, politics are in disarray. Serious students speak of the "ungovernability of democracy." 10 1
History since 1789 has seen a steadily expanding franchise and the rise
of decentralized groups that dominate the government, at times even
challenging the State's claim to sovereignty. The name for the political
order is pluralism. In theory, people form groups, and out of the clashes
between them something called the public or national interest is supposed to evolve. That is a romantic conception of politics, far from reality (although some use it to argue that the Supreme Court should have
a lesser role). Political pluralism is Adam Smith economics writ large
100.
TOWARD

In a forthcoming book, tentatively entitled GETTING THERE FROM HERE:
A CONSTITUTION OF HUMAN NEEDS, I am developing this idea in some

detail.
101. E.g., Professor Samuel Huntington. See Huntington, The United States, in
M. CROZIER, S. HUNTINGTON & J. WATANUKI, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY 59
(1975).
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and transferred to politics. It is no more valid there than in economics.
Why judges? Because there is no alternative, if the American system of
constitutionalism is to be saved.
I am not suggesting, of course, that the Court as commander is
always followed. Far from it. Recent decisions, such as Haig v. Agee
and Dames & Moore v. Regan °2 display a tendency on the part of the
present Justices to defer to the political branches of government. That
posture of deference, of judicial self-restraint, runs counter to the thesis
propounded in this article. Nevertheless, most members of the Court
today were on the bench when Roe v. Wade was decided; of greater
importance, there is no evidence that the Justices will not impose affirmative duties in appropriate situations. Certainly, it is true that they
have not repudiated the theory of Cooper v. Aaron° 3 --that their decisions are "the law of the land"-nor of Reynolds v. Sims."" The Justices have more than an umpire's function, as Justice William Brennan
noted in 1980:
Under our system, judges are not mere umpires, but, in their own
sphere, lawmakers-a co-ordinate branch of government. While individual cases turn upon controversies between parties, or involve
particular prosecutions, court rulings impose official and practical
consequences upon members of society at large. Moreover, judges
bear responsibility for the vitally important task of construing and
securing constitutional rights ...
The interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory law, while not legislation, is lawmaking, albeit of a kind that is
subject to special constraints and informed by unique considerations. Guided and confined by the Constitution and pertinent statutes, judges are obliged to do discerning, exercise judgment, and
prescribe rules. Indeed, at times judges wield considerable authority to formulate legal policy in designated areas.1°0
102. Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.
Ct. 2972 (July 2, 1981). In the same vein, see Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646
(1981).
103. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
104. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
105. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 and n. 20
(1980) (concurring opinion).
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In that extraordinary statement, Brennan acknowledged what I have
argued in this article. First, general principles are inferred from one
particular situation, even though that is logically impossible; individual
cases impose official and practical consequences upon members of society at large. Second, the Court is indeed, at times, an affirmative commander; it can formulate legal policy.
While several problems of the new role of the Supreme Court have
been outlined above, the essential question, which Court critics tirelessly repeat, goes to the legitimacy of the Court as commander. If, as
the late Professor Alexander Bickel wrote, "Brown v. Board of Education was the beginning,"10 6 surely it is accurate to say that we have not
yet seen the end of judicial lawmaking. The form it will take, the issues
that will be involved, may be difficult to predict; but the position of
power of the fourth major development in Supreme Court history is not
10 7
one that will soon be abdicated.

106. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970).
107. Cf. White, J., dissenting in Miranda v. Arizona:
The Court has not discovered or found the law in making today's decision,
nor has it derived it from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to
make new law and new public policy in much the same way that it has
. . .in interpreting other great clauses of the Constitution. This is what

the Court historically has done. Indeed, it is what we must do and will
continue to do until and unless there is some fundamental change in the
constitutional division of governmental powers.
384 U.S. at 531 (emphasis added).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol6/iss1/2

36

